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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
With the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States has become a supreme 
power that exerts political and military influence over world affairs.  Rogue nations do 
not have the means or the capabilities to confront this hegemonic power with 
conventional warfare methods.  Instead they look to develop asymmetric capabilities to 
combat an overwhelming adversary.  Opposing nations could benefit greatly by 
developing a cyber attack capability that could potentially deal a crippling blow to critical 
infrastructures of the United States.  Although the US is considered to be on the forefront 
of Computer Network Defense (CND) technology, the worldwide availability of the 
Internet and the constant stream of newly discovered vulnerabilities in software make it a 
potentially easy target for exploitation and attack.   
Attacks on the critical infrastructures are becoming more prevalent as access to 
the Internet is expanded.  It is in a foreign country’s best interest to develop a capability 
to degrade, deny, or destroy an adversary’s access to information.  According to Richard 
Clark, a former United States Government (USG) counter terrorism and cyber security 
advisor, rogue countries such as Iraq and North Korea have spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars to develop an atomic bomb.  He postulates that engaging in a cyber war would 
cost less and doesn’t require the support of a nation state.  [Vamosi 02]  However, in 
spite of this prediction and others like it, very little is known with respect to the 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
capabilities and intentions of foreign states.  It is unclear whether hacking activity is state 
sponsored or the actions of unorganized, mischievous hackers, or perhaps even a 
combination of both.  Clearly, a better understanding of the CNA/E activities of a given 
nation state would assist in our development of a robust and proactive CND capability.   
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis is part of a project at the Naval Postgraduate School to assess the 
CNA/E threat of foreign countries.  The definition of Computer Network Operations 
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(CNO) consists of CNA, CNE, and CND.  The threat to critical infrastructures comes 
from CNA/E.  Since CND capabilities are inherently related to exploitation and attack, 
the thesis also addresses defensive capabilities.  The goal is to develop a methodology 
and apply it to selective countries.  The methodology is based on open sources that can 
supplement classified information acquired by the intelligence community  An analysis 
of North Korea has already been completed.  [Brown 04]  This thesis is intended to 
develop the methodology for an analysis of Iran’s CNA/E capability.   
The methodology used for this thesis consisted of analyzing four areas of activity 
relating to a country’s CNA/E capabilities and intentions.  Each of these is discussed in a 
separate chapter.  The first chapter addresses the Iranian information technology 
infrastructure.  The chapter describes its capabilities and limitations.  The chapter also 
discusses laws and regulations associated with Internet use, including computer crime 
laws, and Iran’s current diplomatic and ideological relationships with the United States 
and other countries.  The second chapter is an analysis of academic activity and public 
community.  It examines the involvement of Iranian academia with respect to education 
and research relating to CNA/E.  The third chapter is an examination of the government 
activity in the development of a CNA/E capability.  It shows the Iranian government’s 
interest in expanding the IT infrastructure and its role in elevating Iran’s IT reputation in 
the worldwide scientific community.  The fourth chapter examines the CNA/E activity 
within Iran.  It discusses the various motivations of hackers, provides some examples of 
hacking groups within Iran, and explains the difficulty in identifying these Iranian 
hackers.   
This research consisted of open source unclassified intelligence collection and 
analysis.  Much of the research was conducted using Internet sources, including websites, 
discussion groups, and web logs.  This methodology will be presented in a manner that 
can then be applied in the analysis of another country of interest. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides the background information to help frame the scope of this 
research.  It will examine Iran’s foreign policy, information technology infrastructure, 
and existing legal framework.  In addition, it attempts to provide insight into Iran’s 
motive and technological capability to conduct computer network operations and attack 
against potential adversaries.   
 
B. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
In order to develop an understanding of Iran’s motivation for developing a cyber-
attack capability, a closer look at Iran’s foreign policy is required.  After World War II, 
Iranian leaders had aligned themselves with the Western World.  This was due to the 
ideological commonalities they shared and the perceived aggression from the former 
Soviet Union.  This relationship with the western world dramatically changed when the 
Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979.  After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the 
hostage crisis in 1979-1980, foreign relations with the western world have been on a 
downward spiral.  The leaders of the revolution were skeptical of the United State’s 
heavy involvement in the region and denounced the United States as the “Great Satan.”  
By the early 80’s, most of the political elite inside Iran had accepted this point of view.  
[LOC 04]  Since then, Iran has had a history of challenging the western world and calling 
for the complete removal of all western interests from the Gulf region.  Recent news 
headlines have highlighted the impending danger of Iran’s nuclear program.  These 
reports cite intelligence sources from western countries that claim the existence of secret 
nuclear weapons material production and testing facilities.  Iran claims that these sites do 
not exist and such ambitions are strictly peaceful to ensure adequate power generation 
requirements for their developing country.  Western policy makers contend that their 




and the European Union have been in negotiation with Iran to prevent them from 
acquiring nuclear weapons.  Such negotiations have not been fruitful and have contained 
terse rhetoric from both sides.   
More specifically, the United States has labeled Iran as world’s most active state 
sponsor of terrorism. President Bush has labeled Iran, along with countries such as Iraq 
and North Korea, as being a member of the “Axis of Evil.”  [Bush 04]  This labeling by 
the US government brings with it implications of sanctions to include: 
1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales 
2. Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring a 30-day Congressional 
notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the 
country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism 
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance 
4. Impositions of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions to include: 
-  Requiring the US to oppose any loans by the World Bank and 
other world financial institutions 
-  Allowing families of terrorist attacks to file lawsuits against 
Iranian diplomats in US Courts. 
-  Denying tax credits for income earned in Iran 
-  Authority to prohibit financial transactions with Iran without a 
Department of Treasury license. 
-  Prohibition of Department of Defense (DoD) contracts over 
$100,000 with Iran.   
The import and export of technology items are considered dual-use and are therefore 
prohibited under these sanctions.  [USDOS 03]  Iran has consistently pursued 
relationships with other state sponsors of terror and terrorist organizations. In February 
2005, Iran and Syria announced that they would form a united front against pressure from 
the United States and the western world.  Syria was the only Arab country that continued 
warm relations with Iran during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and has been a strategic 
ally for years. [AP 05]  Iran’s connections to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and 
terrorist organizations has been documented by an Iranian defector and former director of 
intelligence for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  Hamid Reza Zakiri described his 
personal knowledge of Iranian cooperation with other state sponsors of terror and terrorist 
organizations.  For instance, Zakiri tells of the cooperation between North Korea and 
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Iran.  He has personally attended military courses such as psychological warfare, counter 
espionage, and physical security pertaining to nuclear installations for 40 day periods in 
North Korea.  He goes on to describe Iran’s connection with Al-Qa’ida, Hezbollah, and 
other terrorist organizations.  He provides details of Iranian Revolution Guard 
involvement with terrorist organizations in the 1983 bombing in Beirut and the 1985 
hijacking of the TWA airplane resulting in the death of numerous US servicemen.  And 
while Iran did not play an active role in the attacks on September 11, 2001, Zakiri states 
that the Revolutionary Guard received correspondence requesting assistance from Ayman 
Al-Zawhairi.  He stated that while they were ordered not to assist, they were to maintain 
relations with Al-Qa’ida for future operations.  Furthermore, Iran has assisted with the 
harboring of many Al-Qa’ida terrorists following OPERATION ENDURING 
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM to include the transportation of Osama bin Laden’s 
wife and son to Yemen.  Zakiri also speculated that Bin Laden himself may have escaped 
with the assistance of the Revolutionary Guard.  He details relationships with bogus 
companies headed up by Qusay Hussein since the 1990’s to assist with the smuggling of 
oil.  [MEMRI 03]  Smugglers of oil from Iraq generally had unrestricted access to Iranian 
territorial waters.  Iran’s territorial waters became known as a “superhighway” of 
smuggled oil due to a smuggler’s ability to traverse and exit the entire Persian Gulf inside 
Iranian territorial waters.  These strategic connections with other state sponsors of terror 
and terrorist organizations detail a foreign policy that is very hostile to the United States 
and the western world.   
Iran has also established military development relationships with other non-
western military powers throughout the world.  These countries include Russia, North 
Korea, and China.   In mid-2000, Iran announced a “25-year military development 
program” with Russia, for which very little of the details of the agreement are known.  
[Billo/Chang 03]  To counter the American influence on behalf of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
War, the former Soviet Union saw an opportunity to increase its influence by selling 
military equipment.  After the 1991 Gulf War, Russia had lost Iraq as one of its primary 
customers of military equipment. Russia was compelled to further strengthen financial 
ties with Iran to compensate for the closure of its market and to reestablish influence 
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within the region.  The United States had repeatedly tried to convince Russia to cut off 
military support for Iran with very little success.  While the United States has sometimes 
sanctioned the individual entities that deal with Iran, it has never sanctioned the Russian 
government.  [Katzman 03]  Iran and China also have a history of military dealings since 
the early-80’s. To Iran, China is just another source of military equipment that is willing 
to sell technology needed to counter the perceived US aggression.  China does not agree 
ideologically or politically with Iran, but views the relationship as an opportunity to 
divert the US military from the China-Taiwan stand-off.  Besides obvious revenues from 
the sale of its military technology, China also has to ensure an adequate supply of oil in a 
tight market for a growing economy.  [Katzman 03]  As was the case with Russia, the 
relationship between Iran and China is mutually beneficial.   
The Iranian relationship with North Korea is much more forward than that with 
Russia and China.  Traditionally, North Korea has always aligned itself with countries 
such as Iran, Syria, and Libya that share its opposition to the policies of the United States.  
This relationship has been furthered strengthened by the United States’ characterization 
of North Korea and Iran as “rogue states” and institution of trade sanctions against them.  
[Katzman 03]  Although countries such as Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea may not 
agree ideologically or politically, mutual interests have brought these countries together 
to compete better in a world currently dominated by the west. 
Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran’s foreign policy has been extremely 
critical of the influence of the western world.  Iran has shown that it will use any means 
necessary, including acquiring weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen its position in 
the world.  The western world’s heavy reliance on information technology makes cyber-
attack by countries such as Iran a likely possibility.            
 
C. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
As with most developing nations, information technology is just starting to make 
an impact upon the education, economy, and social values within Iran.  With the 
cessation of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, the Iranian government set 
out to develop a plan to restore the Iranian economy.  Included within this plan were 
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requirements for the spread of Information and Communications Technology (ICT).  
Called the First Five Year Plan, it was adopted by the Parliament in early 1990 and has 
experienced three iterations since then.  The current plan is called the Fourth Five Year 
Plan and contains the goals for 2005-2010.  [OXR 04]  The development of information 
technology in Iran was met with initial resistance, but was followed by a much more 
rapid growth of adaptation, use and privatization.  [Rouhani 00] 
The following sections examine different sectors of the information infrastructure.   
 
1. Telecommunications 
  Iranian telecommunications are currently inadequate, but are being modernized 
and expanded to not only increase the volume and efficiency of urban services, but also 
to increase reach to rural areas throughout Iran.  The number of main telephone lines has 
risen dramatically with only 830,000 installed main lines in 1978 [ITU 05] compared to 
14.5 million installed lines in 2003.  According to the International Telecommunication 
Union there were 27.06 subscribers per 100 inhabitants of Iran.  [CIA 05]  While this is 
still a low penetration factor compared to the developed world, the overall increase has 
been dramatic.  As with most developing nations, demand for cellular phones within Iran 
has taken off.  In 2003, the mobile handset market grew by almost 26% within the 
African and Middle East region.  [AMET 04]  This rapid expansion is due to the low cost 
required to expand cellular phone infrastructure compared to traditional telephone lines.  
As depicted below, Iran has one of the fastest growing telecommunications expansion 
rate in the Middle East.   
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 1990 2003 Percent Increase 
Iran 4.04 27.06 669.8% 
UAE 24.25 101.68 419.3% 
Oman 6.13 31.67 516.63% 
India .6 7.10 1183.3% 
US 56.85 116.96 205.7% 
Saudi Arabia 7.78 47.65 612.5% 
China .59 42.38 7183.1% 
Table 1. Number of Main Telephone Lines and Cellular Subscribers per 100 Population 
[UNSD 04]  
 
In addition to the rapid increase in telephone and cellular phone access within the 
country, access to the world telecommunication network has also greatly increased by a 
combination of satellite and fiber optic connectivity.  One such fiber optic line is the 
Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) Project.  Agreed upon in 1993, it is the world’s largest 
overland fiber-optic system.  By following the ancient silk trading route, it provides a link 
that stretches from China to Europe.  The fiber has the capability of up to 622 MBps.  
Participants in the TAE Project include China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkey, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  The Iranian portion of the fiber-optic line is 721 km and 
connects Turkmenistan to Turkey. (see Figure 1. below)  Another fiber optic line that 
links Iran to the global communication system is a submarine line that links Iran’s 
southern coast with Fujirah in the United Arab Emirates.  It is a 172 km, un-repeatered 
line that provides a direct connection supporting a bandwidth of up to 140 Mb/s.  These 
fiber optic lines assist with providing Iran the much needed bandwidth of a developing 
nation.  [ORN 99]  
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Figure 1.   TAE Fiber-Optic Line [ORN 99]  
 
The final link of Iran’s telecommunication system to the world is through satellite 
technology.  Prior to recent developments, Iran’s satellite communication ability was 
limited to using Inmarsat land earth stations connected to commercially operated 
satellites over the Indian Ocean that routed calls to terrestrial phone lines.  Since the 
1970’s, Iran has considered creating a government-owned GEO (Geostationary Earth 
Orbit) communications network.  Through initial planning agreements in 1993, France, 
Italy, Russia and China, are said to be assisting with the development of the Zohreh 
(Venus) systems of satellites. This system of 2 satellites will expand Iran’s 
telecommunication capability, provide military and data communications, and improve 
Iran’s broadcasting capability.  The ground infrastructure needed for this system will 
include five land stations, 135 primary and secondary stations, 27 zonal stations, 31 
community stations, and 1,374 rural stations.  [ORN 99]  In January 2005, a contract was 
signed in Tehren for the delivery and launch of the Zohreh satellites by a Russian 
subcontractor called The Academician Reshetnev Applied Mechanics Research and 
Production Association.  It is reported that it will take 30-36 months from initial building 
operations to final acceptance.  [SAT 05]  Iran’s interest in space is still in the early 
development phase and aerospace companies throughout the world are willing to provide 
the expertise to expand Iran’s capabilities. 
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2. Internet Infrastructure 
Like the rest of the world, internet usage in Iran has exploded.  Iran’s first use of 
the internet was spearheaded by the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and 
Mathematics (IPM) during the early 1990’s.  The IPM established a link through the 
BITNET network through Iran’s membership in the Trans-European Research and 
Education Networking Association (TERENA).  The link later developed into a full-
fledged internet connection with acceptance of Iran as a Class C node.  Initially the 
primary users were academic and research institutions, but domestic Internet connections 
have grown rapidly.  At times, growth of the Internet has placed Iran among the top 
countries for the rate of growth for internet access.  [Arabshani 97] 
The first Internet Service Provider (ISP) in Iran was the Data Communication 
Company of Iran (DCI).  As of 2000, this government-owned company was the largest 
ISP in Iran.  There are well over 30 ISP’s that provide internet service.  Some of the more 
popular services are Neda Rayneh, IRNET, Virayeshgar Corporation, Apedana, and Pars 
Suppala.  [Rouhani 00]  According to the ITU, internet users per 10,000 inhabitants rose 
from 155.57 in 2001 to 723.66 in 2003.  The number of internet hosts has also risen 
dramatically.  In 2001, there were .38 hosts per 10,000 inhabitants.  This rose to .76 hosts 
per 10,000 inhabitants in 2003.  [ITU 05]  Recently the French company Alcatel won a 
contract to provide the first DSL network in Iran.  Alcatel will provide and support access 
to 100,000 DSL lines over the next three years.  [AMET 04-1]  Prior to this, access to end 
users throughout the country was strictly via a Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) or the Public Data Network (PDN).  The PSTN provides 56kbps dial-up access 
to people willing to pay for service.  Access to the PDN is mostly limited to academic, 
government and some private entities.  Originally, this link used multiple 64kps ISDN 
lines (see below), but was upgraded with a combination of fiber optic backbones and T1 
lines.  [ORN 99]  As of 1999, only 170 locations throughout Iran had access to this 
technology, but that number has grown dramatically since then.  With the announcement 
in early 2004 that Alcaltel was going to provide the first DSL networking Iran, access to 
high-speed internet and information technology promises to improve.   
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Use of the internet has also spilled into the political arena of Iran.  While still a 
very censored medium within the country, the Internet provides more freedom for people 
to speak out when compared to the state-controlled print, television, and radio media.  
Officials running for elections have begun to see the power that access to the internet can 
provide for a campaign.  During the May 1997 presidential campaign, the two 
presidential candidates, President Khatami (http://www.khatami.com) and the 
conservative candidate Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri (http://nategh.co.ir), used the World 
Wide Web to disseminate their messages.  In addition to this, the results of the election 
were posted “live” on the website of the Iranian government at www.netiran.com.  
[Rouhani 2000, 27]  The Internet has also become the voice of many people on the 
political spectrum.  The use of web logs has exploded in the country.  These “blogs,” 
which blur the line between reporting news and expressing political views, have become 
the voice of reformists unsatisfied with the current government.  The government has 
actively attempted to censor the expression of these web journalists.  The use of the 
Internet for Iranian politics will be examined further in the next chapter.     
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Figure 2.   Iran’s inter-city ISDN lines as of 1997.  This network has since been 
expanded to include other cities such asYazd, Zahedan, Arak, and Rasht  [ORN 
99] 
 
Internet usage in Iran has become very controversial.  The debates are similar to 
those within most countries throughout the world about the social impact of the internet.  
The conservatives are concerned with the negative social impacts that the internet brings 
to an Islamic society.  They believe that the influence of westerns ideals, drugs and sex 
will become the demise of the Islamic state.  Furthermore, they believe that the internet 
will foster immorality and the “Americanization” of the Iranian youth.  While many 
conservatives realize that the internet is necessary to continue technological development 
within Iran, their argument is that internet regulation is necessary to protect the Islamic 
society. The more liberal factions within the country believe that such restrictions will 
obstruct the learning development of people and that the individual or their family should 
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limit access to improper information.  They stress the importance of the internet for its 
economic advantages, expeditious transactions and democratic access that it offers.  
[Ebrahimian 03]  These issues are not unusual and are being faced by countries all over 
the world.  However, they become much more dangerous in a theocracy such as Iran in 
which censorship becomes a very likely possibility.     
 
3. Hardware Industry 
When compared to Iran’s successful industrial sectors such as oil and natural gas, 
development of Iran’s technological manufacturing capability has not been as successful.  
Iran’s automobile and military production capability has attracted some foreign 
investment, but Iran’s attempt to create a high technology electronics industry has been 
unsuccessful.  Imported hardware is in limited supply due to import and export trade 
regulations and taxation.  Domestic industries in need of IT products find that there is a 
shortage of national producers of computer and communication hardware.  On a policy 
level, a prevailing barrier to technological advancement is the menial effort to attract 
private sector involvement.  This is due in part to the state’s mismanagement of legal and 
regulatory procedures.  The state controls all national business activities under a 
confusing regulatory framework.  During the 2000 presidential elections, Tehran police 
closed all the cyber-cafes with broadband access due to political reformists gaining 
popularity from their effective use of the internet.   The government cited the lack of 
necessary permits as the reason why the cafes were shut down even though there were 
not any laws requiring permits.   Actions like these create an atmosphere of uncertainty 
for willing investors. There are increasing efforts for privatization of state run sectors of 
the economy.  In October 2004, the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) had 
drawn up a 20-year strategy for economic, social, and cultural development which can 
only be accomplished by privatization.  The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni has 
ordered this plan to take effect commencing 2005.  [Ebrahimian 03]  It is believed that 
privatization of industries will reduce both the amount of government censorship and 
regulation and is the only way to spur economic and commercial development.     
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Iran’s restrictive trade policies also make foreign investment very difficult.  
Taxation on imports are often levied in an inconsistent and undefined manner.  For 
instance, Iran imposes heavy import duties on computer peripheral products such as 
printers and displays.  Businesses that can afford to purchase approved point of sale 
systems cannot afford to purchase the printers or displays that are needed for them.  
Increases in productivity that are gained from the point of sale system are lost in the 
inability to print a receipt.  [Ebrahimian 03] 
Iran’s contradictory legislative actions have also deterred foreign investment.  For 
instance, Iran agreed to a contract in early 2004 with the Turkish cell phone company 
Turkcell to be the first foreign nation to provide nation-wide cellular phone service. 
Several months later, the Iranian legislative body voted to sharply cut the company’s 
share in the multi-billion dollar deal.  The original deal consisted of an alliance of four 
companies; 51% of the shares were to go to Turkcell, 20% to two Iranian 
communications companies, and 9% to Nokia.  Instead, the Parliament voted to increase 
the Iranian portion of the deal to 51% and the remainder to go to Turkcell and Nokia.  
This has caused Turkcell to reconsider and possibly withdraw from the deal.  This type of 
contradictory behavior creates a uncertain business environment and makes future foreign 
investment in any industry much more difficult.    
 
4. Software Industry 
Since the late 90’s and early 00’s there has been a demand from Western firms to 
seek countries with highly trained software engineers to outsource the development of 
coding and thus become more competitive in the market.  Developers have found that 
outsourcing can be much more cost efficient than very expensive domestic employees.  
Countries from all over the world are competing for this outsourcing and Iran is no 
exception.  The Iranian software industry suffers many problems that hamper its 
development as a competitor on the world market.  It is estimated that there are 20,000 
working in the software industry with about 200 companies involved in software 
development.  The required technology level of hardware in Iran is generally lacking.  
Application development in some cases is still based in MS-DOS.  There is widespread 
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lack of software management expertise.  Even with high technical skills, large-scale 
projects often fail due to poor management.  There are no copyright protections of 
foreign-produced software in Iran, so pirating is widespread.  Many software companies 
cannot afford or are unwilling to buy software tools for development and will in turn use 
pirated version of these tools.  Developers are unable to receive technical support from 
the manufacturers for these pirated tools, so they rarely understand the full capabilities of 
the packages.  While there is an eagerness to explore the software export market, there is 
a lack of expertise to develop the necessary relationships needed for foreign investment.  
The US trade embargo has also hampered the software export market.  In addition, there 
is an inability to develop a desirable portfolio of services to export to overseas 
companies.  Development of products for exports requires a thorough understanding of 
the needs of the world market.  Iran has not been able to capitalize on the same industry 
that other countries such as India have due to the general consensus that “lower-level” 
service does not fit in the with “Iranian national character.”  Instead, Iranians preferred to 
focus on “high-level” application work.  Over the years, India has gradually been able to 
break into developing more complex applications by creating a reputation on the world 
market as being proficient in software development.  Another lost opportunity for Iran is 
the lack of collaboration between software companies and universities.  Even with 70% 
of software companies centered around Tehran, there is very little coordination amongst 
them.  Coordination promises to improve with the construction of Technology Park in 
Tehren that will attempt to bring researchers and technology businesses together.  
Currently, there are no Iranian companies with standard certifications such as ISO9000 or 
Capability Maturity Model for software (CMM).  Experiences in India have shown that 
these standards reassure foreign companies wishing to pursue outsourcing.  
[Nicholson/Sahay 03] 
Like the hardware industry, the software industry suffers greatly from a lack of a 
clear policy from the government.  There have been several plans and statements 
describing the importance of establishing a strong software industrial base, but the 
general consensus from those in the industry is that these are rarely followed through.  
The desire to become more competitive on a global scale is there, but there are technical, 
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social, and political barriers to overcome.  These barriers, at least in the near term, 
prevent Iran from establishing a strong foothold in the world software market. 
 
D. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
There are very limited and inconsistent laws in Iran governing the protection and 
use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).  The first law for the legal 
protection of software products was enacted in the year 2000.  This law, called “Support 
for Computer Software Developers,” gave legal protection of software copyrights to 
domestically produced software.  Software applications that are produced and properly 
registered with the Supreme High Council of Informatics are legally protected from 
pirating.  Even with this law, software pirating is still widespread since it is rarely 
enforced.  While this law establishes legal protection for domestic software, there is no 
protection for imported software.  In 2003, a bylaw was passed defining the procedure for 
the execution of ICT expansion.  The specifics of the bylaw include an implementation of 
e-government initiative and expansion of ICT in education.  [Sanaray 05]  While these 
initiatives are a good start, there are still some issues that need to be addressed.  There is 
no definition of cyber-crime and therefore no laws to prevent it.  In addition to this, 
copyright laws need to be enforced and protections expanded to include foreign 
intellectual property.  The Iranian government has promised to improve legislation to 
provide a more secure investing environment for foreign interests.  Without clear 
definition of cyber-crime laws, Iran’s internet community runs rampant in lawlessness 
and ensures that hackers will go unpunished for their actions.     
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the background necessary for the basis of this thesis.  It 
examined Iran’s foreign policy, information technology infrastructure, and legal 
framework.  The political alignments, basic technological capabilities, and legal 
consequences provide insight into the ability and motivations for state-sponsored hackers 
to conduct cyber-attack against the United States. 
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III. ACADEMIC ACTIVITY AND PUBLIC COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes Iranian academic and public community involvement with 
respect to Computer Network Attack and Exploitation capabilities.  It will discuss the 
Information Technology related educational opportunities available to Iranians as well as 
any activity in the public community that may be related to developing a cyber-attack 
capability.    
 
B. IRANIAN ACADEMIC OPPORTUNITIES 
In order to assess Iran’s cyber attack capabilities, a thorough examination of its 
academic institutions must be conducted.  Iran has an extensive academic research 
system spread throughout the country.  Like other developed nations, students have the 
opportunity to get undergraduate and graduate educations in major fields ranging from 
philosophical areas such as Islamic studies to sciences such a mathematics, engineering, 
and physics.  In particular, access to information technology related educations is widely 
available to those students that qualify for entry based on national exams.  The analysis 
provided is limited to the major institutions that had public information available. 
 
1. Sharif University of Technology 
Located in Teheran, Sharif University of Technology is one of the largest 
engineering schools in Iran. It was established in 1966 under the name of Aryarmehr 
University of Technology. When it was first founded there were 54 faculty members and 
a total of 412 students. In 1980, the university was renamed Sharif University of 
Technology. SUT now has a total of 300 full-time faculty members, approximately 430 
part-time faculty members and a population of about 8,000 students. Undergraduate and 
graduate degrees are offered in computer engineering and software engineering.   
 Within SUT is the Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center 
(AICTC).  This center conducts research in various aspects of Information and 
Communication Technology.  Its faculty educational backgrounds range from computer 
 18 
science, information technology, engineering, and mathematics from both western 
universities and Iranian universities.  Several faculty members had degrees from U.S. 
universities such as University of Illinois and Pennsylvania State University.  Some of the 
research that the center conducts includes video communication in wireless networks 
such as scalable video coding, error concealment and post-processing techniques, rate 
control, wireless media streaming, transporting video over 3G wireless networks, and 
mechanisms to improve multimedia applications throughput over wireless links.  The 
center is also heavily involved in the development of Farsi Linux, a government directed 
OS initiative to lessen the dependence of western based software makers.  [SHARIF 05]      
While some of the professor’s biographies included interests in computer security, 
there were a couple of faculty members that stood out.  Professor Shahram Bakhtiari 
shows an extensive interest in computer security topics.  He received his M.S. and Ph.D 
from Wollongong University in Australia.  He has published extensively in journals and 
conference proceedings such as the Journal of Universal Computer Science (J.UCS) and 
ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control (SIGSAC) Review.  Some 
interesting topics of his publications are “Keyed Hash Functions,” “Practical and Secure 
Message Authentication,” and “On the Weaknesses of Gong's Collisionful Hash 
Function.”  Some of the courses he teaches are called Systems and Networks Security, 
Advanced Topics in Programming, Data Structures and Design of Algorithms, and 
several programming courses in different languages. A course syllabus of the Systems 
and Networks Security course was also posted on his site.   The course description is 
quoted below: 
In this course we study the applications of cryptography in 
systems/networks security and show how systems may encounter 
unauthorized access by intruders. Due to the extensive use of computer 
networks and the Internet, there exist a range of methods that intruders 
might use to access the information and files stored on a particular host. 
Students who take this course become familiar with methods of attack and 
the ways to protect systems and networks. 
He also posted links to the presentations that he uses for this class.  One such presentation 
was titled “Hacking Techniques.”  However, the links were broken, so the presentation 
could not to be viewed.  [Bakhtiari 01]  Also found through a simple google search of 
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“sharif university security” was the resume for Sauleh S. Etemady.  He recently 
completed his M.S. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Michigan State 
University.  His undergraduate work was performed at SUT.  While a student at SUT he 
taught courses such as Network Security, Securing and Optimizing Linux, and TCP/IP 
Administration for the AICTC.  His publications include “Proposal for Information 
Security Center,” “Mail Security Solutions,” and “Security Aspects of Operating 
Systems.”  While he is no longer affiliated with SUT, his computer security background 
was established during his time at Sharif as a student.  [Etemadi 05]  Another interesting 
personal web page found from SUT was that of Hashem Habibi who is currently a 
student studying for his Masters degree in Software Engineering.  His personal page 
consists of links to pages of fellow classmates, photo galleries, and links to various web 
logs and hacking sites.   His page also mentions a Network Security Center at SUT with 
pictures of some of the members of the center, however, a website for the Network 
Security Center was not found.  Another biography found was that of a PhD candidate 
named Mohammad Abdollahi Azgomi.  He has numerous papers published and has 
taught several courses on computer security topics.  Some of his more notable 
publications include “Design and Implementation of a Firewall in Computer Networks,” 
“Security Enhancement for Network Services,” and “Modeling and Analysis of Reactive 
Systems.”  According to his resume, he has consulted for the government on network 
security matters in the Iran Expediency Council Secretariat, State Organization for 
Registration of Deeds and Properties of Iran, Iranian Customs Administration (IRICA).  
He has taught several programming and simulation courses at Sharif and other Iranian 
universities.  [Azgomi 05] 
Sharif University of Technology has been engaged in extensive computer security 
research and education.  Several faculty members and students have focused on computer 
security topics.  There are also courses in computer security.  While the principles of 
computer security are being taught to students, there was no evidence that the school was 




2. University of Tehran 
The main part of the University is located at the center of Tehran. Some of the 
faculties and research centers are also located in Karaj, Qom, Pakdasht, Sari and 
Kheyrood Kenar. The University has 1500 faculty members. At present, this University 
admits students to 111 B.A./B.S. degree programs, 177 M.A./M.S. degree programs and 
156 Ph.D. degree programs. The educational capacity of this university is about 32 
thousand students.  According to the university’s website, 340 foreign students also study 
at the University.  
Like other universities, the information technology related faculty has wide 
ranging educational background in fields such as computer science, computer 
engineering, and mathematics.  Degrees offered include software engineering and 
computer engineering.  The university’s advertised research projects include mostly 
electrical and computer engineering topics.  One particular project listed was called “Iran 
National Grid Blackout, Power System Protection Point of View.”  There was not any 
additional information to ascertain if this research was pertaining to defense of 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  The University does 
conduct some defense related research as a master’s thesis was found that focused on 
improving missile accuracy.  The school’s website had very little information regarding 
the specifics of the degree programs or individual course information.  [University of 
Teheran 05] 
 
3. Amirkabir University of Technology 
Also located in Tehran, the Amirkabir University of Technology was established 
in 1958.  The university’s website boasts close ties with the Ministry of Science, 
Research and Technology.  There are currently 6400 students enrolled in 132 disciplines.  
It has 14 engineering groups, 7 research centers, and an ACM chapter.  It offers 
undergraduate and graduate degrees in Information Technology and Computer Science.  
Although this school has a relatively low enrollment compared to other Iranian 
institutions, its research seems to be more focused on computer security topics.  Within  
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the Computer Engineering and Information Technology department is the Data Security 
Research Laboratory.  The website’s description of the laboratory’s mission is quoted 
below:  
The role of this laboratory is to help promoting research and innovations 
on computer, information and communications security, and help training 
engineers and scientists in related areas, while there will be special 
attentions on design and analysis of cryptographic algorithms, design and 
analysis of secure protocols with public use, developing hardware and 
software for secure data communications, processing and computations, 
and also for secure speech and image communications and processing, and 
design and implementation of secure computer systems, e.g. secure o.s. 
However, all aspects of cryptology and computer and communication 
security are interested research objectives of the Lab. 
There is evidence that this security center actively attempts to identify vulnerabilities in 
software systems.  A posting was found on the New Order security site (neworder.box.sk) 
from April 2003 from Haamed Gheibi and Salman Niksefat of the Data Security 
Research Laboratory housed at Amirkabir University of Technology. They claimed in the 
post to find a Microsoft Windows SMB flaw.  [NEW 03]  Unsuccessful attempts to gain 
the attention of Microsoft through emails and phone calls warranted them posting this 
information on the Bugtraq mailing list.  Replies to the Bugtraq posting claimed that this 
exploit has been used before and that this vulnerability can be corrected by changing the 
LMCompatabilitylevel to a higher level as directed in the Windows 2000 Hardening 
Guide.  [Bugtraq 03]  Their attempt to contact Microsoft prior to publishing the flaw 
suggests that he was not maliciously subverting the software, instead attempting to get 
the vulnerability fixed.  Gheibi also represented Amirkabir in the 2003 ACM 
International Computer Programming Contest held in Tehren, which is explained in 
greater detail in a following section.  [ACMICPC 03]   
As with other universities, the faculty educational and research vary within the 
fields of information technology and computer sciences.  One particular faculty member 
that stood out was Professor Mehran Soleiman Fallah.  His interests and educational 
background are exclusively in the computer security field.  His PhD dissertation was an 
analysis of denial of service attacks and a determination of the weaknesses of the protocol  
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upon which the attacks were carried out.  Other faculty members also listed computer 
security as an interest, but Fallah was the only one who exclusively researched in this 
field.  
 
4. Isafahan University of Technology 
Located in the city of Isafahan, this university has about 7000 undergraduate and 
nearly 2000 graduate students studying Agriculture, Engineering, Basic Sciences and 
Natural Resources. Within IUT is the Information and Communication Technology 
Institute (ICTI).  Research areas within the ICTI include distributed system development, 
management information systems, and computer networks.  No specific information was 
found regarding specific degrees, research or classes in computer or network security 
related fields.  [IUT 05]  
In September 2005, the university will host the 3rd Annual Iranian Society of 
Cryptology Conference.  Notable conference topic areas include cryptographic 
algorithms, digital signatures and hashing algorithms, PKI, network security, firewall and 
access control, stenography, electronic security laws and legal issues, and intrusion 
detection systems.  Committee members for the conference include numerous professors 
from IUT as well as from other Iranian universities.  The conference offered an open 
invitation to anyone wishing to attend.  There does not appear to be any published 
limitations on conference attendants.  [ISCC 05] 
 
5. University of Isfahan 
Located in the city for which it is named, the University of Isfahan has a student 
population of 14,000.  It has 450 faculty members and a wide variety of academic majors.  
It offers curriculums in information technology, computer science, and computer 
engineering.  As with the other universities, faculty member have varying educational 
backgrounds.  Research interests listed by faculty biographies cover traditional research 
areas expected from any major university.  Three professors focused on computer 
security research.  The biography of Professor Behrouz Tork Ladani lists formal 
specification and verification, cryptographic protocols, information system security 
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analysis and design, information security standards and applications, network security, 
and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).  He has several papers written in the same subject 
areas for various security conferences that were held both inside and outside Iran.  
Another faculty member, Professor Ahmad Baraani-Dastjerdi, is also heavily interested 
in research areas such as security in object-orientated databases, cryptography, security in 
computing, and computer science.   He also has many papers written that support his 
research in those areas.  A third faculty member, Professor Shahram Bakhtiari has 
research interests of network security, VPNs, and cryptologic protocols.  He also teaches 
artificial intelligence, formal methods, and cryptology and distributed security system 
classes.  He has published numerous security related articles for various journals and 
conferences.  [Bakhtiari 01] 
Graduate and undergraduate degrees offered include Computer Engineering, 
Software Engineering, and Information Technology Engineering.  More specific 
information regarding research areas or class descriptions required intranet access. 
There are many other universities within Iran.  The institutions listed above had 
the most substantial information technology, computer science, or software curricula of 
those websites examined.  However, access to information varied.  Some institutions 
required privileged access to view information pertaining to research programs, while 
others had inoperable websites.  In general, Iranian academic institutions exhibit ongoing 
research interest and education in computer security related topics.  The institutions’ 
faculty had a wide range of educational backgrounds to include western universities.  The 
information available shows Iran’s academic community does not exhibit any activity 
outside the norm of typical academic institutions.  No evidence was found from academic 
institutions of open government sponsorship to develop an Iranian cyber-attack 
capability. 
    
C. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATIONS AND 
PUBLICATIONS 
Commensurate with the national goal of becoming a leader in information 
technology in the Middle East, there is a substantial network of information technology 
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associations and publications.  Participants in these publications and associations come 
from the academic and business communities of Iran.  Web sites and print publications 
promoting scientific exchange are abundant throughout the country.    
There are a number of computer-related associations in Iran.  Participation in 
these societies consists of professionals and researchers from all over the world.  Some of 
these are chapters of world-wide associations while some are strictly focused on Iranian 
Information Technology.  For instance, the Association of Computer Machinery has a 
professional chapter located in Tehran and student chapters at Sharif University of 
Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology and University of Qazvin.  These 
chapters hold workshops, social gatherings, and discussions regarding the advancement 
of computing.  Members from these chapters actively contribute to ACM publications. 
ACM chapters within the country also compete in the yearly ACM-International 
Collegiate Programming Contest (ICPC).  The 29th Annual World Finals were held in 
Shanghai, China in April 2005.  International teams including some from China, Russia, 
and Korea competed. Also attending were top US Universities such as Duke, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and University of Illinois.  Iran sent teams from 
Sharif University of Technology and Amirkabir University of Technology.   AUT and 
SUT tied for 17th place, ahead of all US university teams.  [ACMICPC 05]  There have 
also been a lot of Iranian schools represented in previous regionals.  Sharif University of 
Technology is hosting the Asia regional contest for the next ACM-ICPC competition in 
November 2005. 
There are also societies within Iran that focus exclusively on national information 
technology issues.  A comprehensive list of these societies can be found at the Pars Times 
(www.parstimes.com).  Numerous scientific associations and institutions are listed in a 
wide range of fields.  Some of these relating to ICT include the Iran Informatics 
Companies Association, Information Technology Council, Iranian Organization of 
Scientific and Technical Research, and the Iran and Information Society.  The Academic 
Center of Educational, Culture, and Research hosts a website that catalogs papers 
submitted to various academic journals from Iranian researchers.  
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(http://www.sid.ir/En/Index.asp)  It contains 16740 documents in many fields including 
Information Technology. 
There are also several IT-related online news magazine publications.  These 
publications include PC World Iran (http://www.pcworldiran.com/) and the ITNA 
(http://itna.ir/).  These publications are geared to researchers, professionals, and 
consumers with an interest in the field.  These sites are similar to those such as 
CNET.com or PC Magazine found in the US.  In addition to magazine publications, most 
major newspapers have science and technology sections that discuss news and 
advancement within the industry.   
The information technology publishing within Iran is quite extensive.  There is an 
obvious interest within the country to disseminate and exchange information related to 
IT.  Iranian scientists and professionals actively participate in both Iranian and world-
wide associations.   Their participation is measured by active contributions in peer-
reviewed academic journals, newspapers, and computer related magazines.   
 
D. IRANIAN PUBLIC INTERNET COMMUNITY 
As access to technology increases, so does participation on the Internet within 
Iran.  The Iranian theocracy is trying desperately to balance the need for more 
information exchange while maintaining control of a growing opposition. Groups 
opposing the Iranian government are using the Internet as a medium of communication.  
A rapidly growing virtual community of people who are openly exchanging ideas has 
become a tool for the political opposition.  Contrary to government attempts to shut them 
down, reformists continue to use web logs to voice their opinions.  In addition to Iranian 
politics, the Internet has become the gathering place for those with an interest in network 
security.  These include both blackhat and whitehat groups.  Whitehat hackers identify 
security weaknesses in a computer system or network, but instead of taking advantage of 
it, expose the weakness in a way that will allow the system’s owner to correct it.  On the 
other hand, blackhat hackers identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the same manner, 
but instead exploit the weakness for a variety of reasons.  This section will examine 
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political websites, web logs and white hat activity.  Blackhat activity within Iran will be 
examined in greater detailer in subsequent chapters.   
 
1. The Internet and Politics 
Over the last 10 years, an increasingly powerful reform movement has taken root 
in Iran.  Experts have begun to question whether the Internet has been critical for this 
development.  As previously discussed, websites promoting political opinions have 
become commonplace.  The government has tried to block access to these sites, but as 
Dr. Payman Arabashi, an expert on Iranian telecommunications stated in an interview, 
“web page content monitoring is not easily regulated.  Although all ISPs in Iran do 
provide web hosting for their users, many users choose to use free web hosting services 
abroad…So as long as you can get on the Net, you can pretty much do whatever you 
want, including setting up web pages outside of Iran, or surfing to any sites that may be 
‘blocked’ using a variety of proxy and/or annonymizing services [such as safeweb.com].”  
[Mazaar 02] 
Numerous Iranian political websites have been published on the Internet.  Some 
of the more significant of these are Presideent Khatami at http://www.president.ir/; the 
reformist parliament at www.majlis.irl; a website from the 2001 presidential election 
http://www.entekhab80.20m.com/; outspoken critic of the current regime and Shi’ia 
cleric Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri at http://www.montazeri.com; and the Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khameini at http://www.wilayah.ir/.  The importance of this new 
medium is beginning to be recognized as more candidates seek the support of the youth 
of Iran.  Dr. Assad Homayoun, the President of Azedagan, an Iranian exile organization, 
argues that “Mao Tse-Tung used to say that real powers come from the barrel of a gun, 
but today real power comes from the Internet.”  His opinion is slightly exaggerated, but 
the Internet can be partly responsible for democratic progress within Iran.  Nasser 
Hadian-Jazy, a political science professor from the University of Tehren agrees that, “like 
it or not, the satellite and the Internet are changing Iran and the conservatives have no 
idea how to deal with it.” [Mazaar 02] 
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The use of web logs, commonly known as blogs, has grown considerably in Iran.  
A blog can take on many different implementations such as journalism, political 
campaigns, media programs, and even corporations.  The most influential blogs inside 
Iran are those that are centered on politics.  Blogs tend to overcome the tight control that 
a conservative theocracy such as Iran has over the media.  The author and readers can 
exchange information or discuss stories that quite possibly would have never made it to 
the Iranian conventional media.  Many have said that these blogs have become the voice 
of the opposition to the current regime and have advanced the cause of democracy in 
Iran.  There are an estimated 65,000 blogs written in Farsi. Farsi is the fourth most widely 
used language on web logs.  [WIKI 05]  A comprehensive listing of blogs written by 
Iranians can be found at http://blogsbyiranians.com.   The government has responded to 
the dissent among bloggers by arresting dozens of these web journalists.  Some of those 
detained, such as Arash Sigarchi and Mojtaba Saminejad, are reportedly being held in 
solitary confinement and are being tortured.  The government has not explicitly stated 
that their opposition is the reason for imprisonment, but both detainees have actively used 
their blogs to criticize the government.  Reporters Without Borders, human rights groups, 
and other bloggers are attempting to gain the release of all Iranian bloggers and cyber-
dissidents. [Boyd 05]     
 
2. White Hat Network Security Groups 
Along with widespread usage of the Internet for political purposes, there is a 
growing interest in network security.  Rapid expansion of computer technology in Iran 
has resulted in a lack of training or attention towards network security.  While Iranian 
academic institutions have begun to teach these fundamentals, many computer systems 
within Iran are targets of opportunity due to a lack of adequate protection.  Widespread 
successful attacks on websites hosted in Iran highlight the inadequate security awareness.  
In response to this threat, there are numerous white-hat websites that have been 
published.  Some examples of these are Hat Squad Security Team (http://www.hat-
squad.com), Iran Security (http://weblog.iransecurity.com), IR Computer Emergency 
Response Team (www.ircert.com), Iran Virus Database (http://www.irvirus.com/), and 
Crouz Security Team (http://www.crouz.com/).  These sites, written in Farsi, appear to 
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discuss vulnerabilities.  They are similar to English-language white-hat sites that purport 
to expose software vulnerabilities and prompt software manufacturers to patch them.  The 
goal of these web communities is to ensure software makers create more secure software. 
In addition to white-hat websites, an Iranian group is also listed on the Defcon 
website as one of its membership groups.  Defcon holds an annual computer security 
conference in Las Vegas and is considered the largest underground hacking convention in 
the world.  Defcon groups were established to share security information among its 
members and to provide some cohesion within the hacker community.  The Tehran based 
group was formed in February 2004 by a hacker named Tenebrious.  Very little is known 
of this group’s activities, but participation in the Defcon organization shows a willingness 
to share information among its members.  [DEFCON 05] 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The study and use of information technology has become widespread throughout 
Iran.  Iranian learning institutions are actively teaching the fundamentals of Information 
Technology through undergraduate and graduate degrees.  Research at these institutions 
is commensurate of what is to be expected from academic institutions throughout the 
world.  The public community in Iran also actively participates through Information 
Technology.  The Internet has become a virtual community used not only for the 
advancement of science, but also for political activism, conventional Iranian media, and 
webbloggers struggling to derive the truth from a Islamic theocracy that tightly controls 






IV. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine Iranian government activity pertaining to CNA/E.  It 
will detail government entities involved in the research and development of IT, the use of 
IT in its military doctrine, and the likelihood of Iran conducting cyberwarrior training. 
 
B. GOVERNMENT ENTITIES INVOLVED IN IRANIAN IT 
DEVELOPMENT 
Throughout the last decade, Iran has expressed a strong interest in developing its 
information communications and technology infrastructure.  It has made considerable 
progress in expanding access to information technology.  The Second-Five Year Plan 
emphasized a policy in which the government would advance technology research to 
solve developmental problems.  According to the plan, this policy was to be realized by: 
• Developing a research system conducive to further enhancement, better 
arrangement, and coordination of research activities and their evaluation 
• Setting research priorities 
• Strengthening relations between the country’s research centers and their 
international counterparts 
• Reinforcing an organic relationship between research application and 
education. 
[Shokoohi 96]  Furthermore, President Khatami expressed his views on the government’s 
role in scientific research in a speech at the 11th Khwarazmi Science Festival: 
If we are determined to make progress, our political system, government 
and state must earnestly engage in scientific inquiry and research so that 
our future course will be based on firm foundations. What is of great 
importance to us is turning research and investigation into a culture and 
everyday practice so that it can permeate all walks of life and all aspects of 
our society, and consequently, the notion can take root that life without 
inquiry and research is a life without glory and honor. The ground root and 
underlying foundation of our actions in the realms of science, technology, 
social sciences and civil service should be formed by research and 
investigation. To instill such a social attitude demands national 
determination, and the government alone will not be able to accomplish 
such a great task. We are all aware that the pivot of all research and 
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investigation is man, that is, the thinking man. Therefore, real progress 
and true development is tantamount to the development of the human 
element. Out of the four elements which together form what we know as 
technology, three of them, that is, information and knowledge, skilled 
manpower, and management concern human beings, and only one, namely 
technical tools and equipment, are supposed to be non-human, although 
they, too, are actually the objective form and the crystallization of human 
thought. This goes to show that technology, which seems to be the most 
materialistic aspect of human society, is, in fact, the most human of all.  
[Khatami 05] 
Given the policies set forth by the Second Five Year Plan and the opinion of the Iranian 
President, the government plays an active role in the development of information 
technology.   
There are several government research institutions that conduct scientific 
research. Together with research from the academic institutions previously described, 
these institutions promote the rapid development and deployment of technology in Iran.  
The primary research institutions pursuing information technology topics are the Iran 
Telecommunications Research Center, Guilan Science and Technology Park, and the 
Pardis Technology Park. 
 
1. Iran Telecommunications Research Center 
Established in 1970, the Iran Telecommunications Research Center (ITRC) is the 
research arm of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.  It has 
evolved as a key consultative body, liaising with and influencing the Ministry’s decision-
making concerning emerging technologies and international interactions.  The center 
boasts about 600 active researchers from academia and industry throughout the country 
and has an estimated 21,000 sq. meters of modern laboratories.  The ITRC is a member 
of the European Technical Standards Institute, participating in the development of new 
standards development and customization studies.  According to their website, the center 
also embraces collaboration in the development of new technologies with peers from all 
over the world.  Its stated goals are listed below: 
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• Launching research studies and disseminating results and 
experiences nationwide. 
• Provision of consultancy services 
• Directing and managing national standards and regulations of ICT 
In its role as a consultant, the center advises government policy makers in the ICT 
“blueprint” for Iran.  The center also confers with other international entities to improve 
the Iranian ICT infrastructure. Its research groups are divided into 4 different 
departments. The Information Technology department consists of multimedia, IT 
application, and IT strategy and infrastructure research groups.  The Strategic 
Management department consists of ICT economic and developmental planning, ICT 
security management, strategic and regulatory issues, and integrated telecommunications 
network management groups.  The Networking department studies data networks, 
wireless technology, and switching system groups.  Finally, the transmission department 
focuses on antennas and radio systems, satellite communications, and optical 
communications groups.  The Third-Five Year Plan established a framework for the 
ITRC to study topics such as a data telecommunication management networks with an 
emphasis on design of network telecommunication management network, network 
evaluation and quality of service (QOS)‚ intelligent networks (IN) and related services‚ 
network security‚ asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) and synchronous digital hierarchy 
(SDH). 
Within the ITRC are additional study groups that are aligned with the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T) study groups that focus standards 
development and research in the form of study questions.  According to the ITRC 
website, they are active in 12 groups and have generated numerous scientific and 
technical papers.   Of particular interest was the ITRC participation in Study Group 17, 
Security, Languages, and Telecommunication Software.  The ITRC website states that 
Study Group 17 has prepared 30 papers, conducted 5 workshops, and provided 
consultancy for executive departments since 2001.  [ITRC 05] 
In addition to conducting research, the ITRC hosts international conferences to 
further promote the scientific achievement of Iran.  An International Symposium of 
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Telecommunications was being organized for September 2005.  The purpose of the 
symposium is to highlight the most recent developments in communications and 
information technologies to include new concepts, theories, technological advancements, 
services, and network infrastructure improvements.  [ITRC 05]  An internet search for the 
ITRC yielded the resume of a Professor Shahram Bakhtiari of Sharif University of 
Technology.  His resume includes an extensive background in network security, 
cryptanalysis, and object orientated design.  He has run information security workshops 
for several conferences to include the Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering 
(ICEE '99) hosted at the ITRC.  [Bakhtiari 01]  Another internet search result for the 
ITRC yielded a program for the 17th International Conference for Computer Applications 
in Industry and Engineering held in Orlando, Florida in 2004.  One of the presentations, 
given by three scientists from the ITRC, was entitled “A Systematic Approach to 
Network Security Assessment” by Mehdi Rasti, Davood Sarramy, and Mahmood 
Khaleghi.  [CAINE 04]  A search for Mehdi Rasti yielded another publication titled 
“Neural Network Based Dynamic Anomaly Detection in Computer Networks: A Novel 
Training Paradigm Using Abnormal Behavior” from CAINE 03 held in Las Vegas, NV.  
[Varjani 04]  Participation in International conferences demonstrates the ITRC’s interest 
in contribution to the advancement of computer security topics.   
As the principle research center for the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology, the ITRC is considered to be one of the principle elements 
of governmental participation of technology.  There was limited information pertaining to 
specific research projects, but given that network security is a topic of study, there may 
be substantial research in that area. 
 
2. Guilan Science and Technology Park 
Formerly known as the Iranian Research Organization of Science and 
Technology, the Guilan Science and Technology Park (GSTP) was established in 1989 as 
a research center and reorganized in 2002 as a technology park.  According to its website, 
some of the park’s goals are to develop research activities in the private sector and to 
assist small companies to find markets for their innovations and products by promoting 
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cooperation with the more established high-tech industry.  It is a member of the 
International Association of Science Parks (IASP) and works in close cooperation with 
the Steinbeis Foundation in Germany.  The GSTP focuses on the agro-food, 
biotechnology, chemistry, electronics, ICT, and tourism industries in Iran.  The 
technology companies that have established themselves in the park include the North 
Sabat Computer Cooperation Company, Guilan Communication and Technology 
Development Company, Green Pooya Net Company, Morvarid Information Technology 
and Software Company, and the Guilan Computer Science Cooperation Company.  
Within the park is an ICT Incubation center that provides additional assistance to 
technology companies aiming to reduce the inherent risk of technology development.  
[GSTP 05]  While this park has been a success, its principle focus is to promote small 
technological business development.  Its remote location relative to the thriving 
technology and research environment centered on Tehran presents an obstacle in 
becoming a premier research park in the Middle East.  [Khatami 05] 
 
3. Technology Cooperation Office 
The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) was founded in 1984 as the Office of 
Scientific and Industrial Studies to provide consultation to the President of Iran.  It was 
renamed to the TCO to promote the international cooperation in the field of advanced 
technologies.  The TCO supports Iranian organizations in the following ways:  
• Technology development planning 
• Organizing design offices and R&D centers 
• Coordinating joint research projects 
• Organizing specialized training courses, seminars and exhibitions 
• Technology procurement and localization 
• Establishing relations between Iranian institutions and foreign industrial 
and scientific research centers for technology cooperation 
The TCO is active in several fields including Biotechnology, Aerospace, Information 
Technology, Software, New Materials, Industrial Processes, Energy, Civil Engineering, 
Infrastructures, Power Engineering, Studies on Technology Development and  
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Technology Management.  Attempts to view the website directly were unsuccessful due 
to the website being taken offline.  An archive of the TCO website is provided in Figure 
3. 
 
Figure 3.   Technology Cooperation Office Archived Website [TCO 04] 
 
4. Paradis Technology Park 
While still being developed, the Pardis Technology Park (PTP) was established to 
foster better cooperation between large-scale public and private research.  Hoping to 
capitalize on the success of Silicon Valley in the United States, the park has declared 
itself to be the future Silicon Valley of Iran.  PTP is under the direct management of a 
Board of Directors representing the TCO and Sharif University of Technology.  The 
involvement of the TCO shows a high level of governmental support and control.  
[UNIDO 05]  Its close proximity to the rapidly expanding high-tech industry in Tehran 
and several academic institutions such as Sharif University of Technology and the 
University of Tehran make it a very promising venture.  With a focus on ICT, the park 
claims the support from a myriad of local and international scientific organizations.  The 
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government hopes that the PTP will provide a better opportunity for foreign investment 
of Iranian ICT.  The park is considered to be the heart of Iran’s strategic technology 
development.  With an area of over 60 acres available, the park promises to provide 
leading edge IT infrastructure and communal facilities.  Its focus areas will be advanced 
engineering, biotechnology, chemistry, electronics, ICT, and nano-technology.  At least 
45 companies have thus far agreed to purchase land in the park.  A picture of the 
proposed headquarters building and park plans are included in Figure 4.   By leveraging 
public, academic, and private research into a single geographic area, Iran hopes to 
establish this area as the premium center for technology research in the Middle East. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Pardis Technology Park Headquarters Complex  [PTP 02] 
 
Outside of traditional academic research being conducted by public universities, 
these research centers are the bulk of the Iranian effort for ICT development.  The 
technology research centers described were established to better coordinate technology 
research and transfer.  Given the relatively tight economic controls placed on businesses 
in Iran, the coordination of competing research efforts by the government is essential to 
further technological innovation.  There was very limited information pertaining to 
specific research projects these institutions were undertaking, but there was substantial 
evidence of a proactive Iranian government approach with regards to ICT development 
support. 
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C. MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Iran’s military doctrine is based on its regional political aspirations, external 
threat perceptions, and the desire to preserve the Islamic state.  Iran’s strategy is to 
become the most dominant power in the Middle East.  Recent campaigns by the United 
States in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted Iran to reevaluate its strategic doctrine.  
The perception of being surrounded by the United States or its allies is shaping the 
country to pursue more asymmetric capabilities to counter a much larger and more 
powerful force.  Iran believes that further development of WMDs and medium to long 
range missile systems are essential to ensure regional security.  Due to increased 
international scrutiny, Iran does not openly admit to the development of WMDs; recent 
press reports on Iran’s nuclear capabilities indicate otherwise.  Regardless of the state of 
its nuclear capabilities, Iran claims to have other means to handle foreign threats.  In 
early August 2004, Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Mohammad Shafii-Rudsari declared 
that Iran “has a diverse defense strategy to meet threats from foreign powers such as 
America and our defense capacity and power are entirely adequate for regional...threats."  
Iran highlighted its asymmetric military doctrine in the Ashura-5 military exercise during 
September 2004.  In this exercise, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted 
coordinated air and ground attacks, strategic missiles, and other weapons and methods.  
Iran also tested its defensive tactics, psychological warfare, and logistical capabilities.  
[Janes 05]   
There was no evidence found to indicate Iran has an ability to conduct CNA/E 
against its enemies, although Iran has historically supported the development of 
asymmetric capabilities such as WMDs to include nuclear and chemical weapons, 
ballistic missile technology, and the sponsorship of terrorism.  [Rubin 02]  Given the 
United States and the western world’s reliance on information technology, a cyber-attack 
capability would give Iran an opportunity to degrade or disrupt adversary information 
dominance strategy.   
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D. TRAINING CYBER-WARRIORS 
Evaluating Iran’s participation in CNA/E activities has proven to be a very 
difficult task.  Outside of the security courses being taught to university students, there 
was no direct evidence of state-sponsored training.  Iran’s cooperation with North Korea 
is well known by the US government to include military technology transfer and training.   
There have been recent reports regarding cooperation in the development of the Iranian 
Shahab-3 and the North Korean Nodong missile systems.  [Shannon 05]  In addition, 
according to an interview of Hamid Reza Zakiri, a senior Revolutionary Guard official 
who defected, Iran has sent military and intelligence officers to North Korea for training 
in psychological warfare and counter-espionage.  Although unconfirmed by the United 
States government, North Korea is reportedly operating a hacking school that produces 
up to 100 cyber-warriors a year.  [McWilliams 03]  The close cooperation between North 




This chapter summarized the participation of the Iranian government in the 
development of information technology.  Iran’s efforts to be on the leading of research in 
the Middle East are evident in the government sponsorship and coordination of research 
by public, private, and academic entities.  In addition, this chapter discussed Iran’s 
military doctrine of developing asymmetric capabilities to counter larger and more 
capable foreign powers.  Also examined were Iran’s close military training ties with 
North Korea and possible cross-training of cyberwarfare personnel.  Given Iran’s steady 
advancement of technological capabilities, it is reasonable to assume that the government 
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V. COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK/EXPLOITATION 
ACTIVITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the CNA/E activities of Iran.  There have been many 
suspicions and generalizations of suspected CNA/E activities being carried out by Iranian 
Internet users.  This chapter provides insight into whether these suspicions are correct by 
discussing various known hacking groups, some possible motivations for hacking, and 
difficulties in identifying Iranian hackers. 
 
B. COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK 
CNA is defined as operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves. CNA relies on interpreted signals in a data stream to execute an attack.  An 
example of CNA is sending a digital signal stream through a network to a central 
processing unit that instructs the controller to interrupt the power supply.  CNA is often 
confused with electronic warfare which targets the electromagnetic spectrum rather than 
computer networks.  [Wilson 04]  
 
C. COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION 
CNE involves the use of espionage of computer systems with tools that penetrate 
systems to return information enabling an adversary to gain an advantage.  Prior to 
conducting CNA, an adversary might conduct a covert and thorough analysis using CNE 
to determine vulnerabilities.  In addition, in order to develop an effective Computer 
Network Defense (CND), CNE may be conducted on adversary information systems to 
accurately diagnose their capabilities.  Therefore, reconnaissance, probing, and scanning 





D. MOTIVATIONS FOR HACKING WITHIN IRAN 
In order to analyze the hacking activities of Iran, an analysis of the motivations of 
this type of activity must be conducted first.  Researchers that have interviewed 
individuals in the hacking community have yielded a number of common themes to 
explain the motivations behind these people.  These motivators were a compulsion to 
hack, curiosity, control and attraction to power, peer recognition, and belonging to a 
group.  [Van Beveren 01]  In addition, monetary gain is increasingly becoming more 
influential for hackers.  In Iran, some hackers have been found with political or religious 
motivations.   
 
1. Traditional Hacking Motivations 
There are common motivations that have motivated hackers world-wide.  These 
include money, power, curiosity, and a sense of belonging.  It is very likely that these 
motivations have some influence on the hacking community in Iran.  Historically, 
hackers have defaced web pages or launched worm and virus attacks to gain notoriety 
among their peers.  Hacking groups’ discussion pages and blogs are littered with 
discussions of accomplishments and vulnerabilities.  One such observation came from an 
Iranian individual named “Spiderhacker.”  In his blog, he talks about hacking into many 
websites due to a lack of security.  Although he claims that he does not like to boast of 
his accomplishments, he believes that he is enhancing Iran’s reputation in the worldwide 
community of hackers.  [Spider 04]  Another hacking motivator is the sense of belonging 
that is created among hacker “teammates.”  Various Iranian hacking teams were found.  
Most of their sites were actively recruiting new members with any level of kind hacking 
or programming proficiency.  Some examples of Iranian groups found include Iran 
Hacker Association, Iran Hacking Sabotage Team, Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team, 
Ashiyane Digital Security Team and Persian Crackers.  There are many more groups that 
have formed ad hoc hacking and computer security communities bound together by the 
Internet that are too numerous to list.  The Iran Hacker Association claimed to have 
scheduled meetings with some of its members in which they promised to post the minutes 
from this meeting.  The website also claimed “Spiderhacker” was the head of the 
association.  [IHA 03]   
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Another motivator that has increasingly becoming more influential for hackers is 
monetary gain.  According to FBI spokesman Paul Bresson, there “has been a rise in the 
cases where the motivation appears not just to be for the purposes of bragging in chat 
rooms, but to actually profit financially.”  He goes on to say that there is an increasing 
growing underground for selling credit card numbers, software vulnerabilities, or renting 
out “botnets.”  Botnets, also known as Zombie networks, are used to extort companies 
who are threatened with a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.  [Ever 05]   
Iranian hacking teams such as the IHS Team and the Ashiyane Digital Security 
Team have hacked sites throughout the country in the hopes of selling security training 
and services.  Both teams are well known for their hacking exploits on an internet 
database of attacks, Zone-H.org.  Their activities on the Internet are directly related to 
services they are selling.  These hacking groups exhibit some of the same motivations of 
hackers worldwide.  The quest for recognition, a sense of belonging, power, curiosity, 
and monetary gain drive individuals into the hacking world.  The lack of education and 
awareness of network security makes the Iranian portion of the Internet a target rich 
environment for skilled and unskilled hackers alike. 
 
2. Politically Motivated Hacking 
Iran is considered to be an oppressive theocracy that has little tolerance for dissent 
or disagreement from the civilian populace.  Stories such as the government practice of 
web-content censorship and the detainment of webloggers that espouse anti-government 
rhetoric validate this belief.  This environment coupled with widespread vulnerabilities 
on the Internet in Iran makes politically motivated hacking, or hacktivism, very likely.  
One of the most well-known hactivists is Oxblood Ruffin the publisher of 
www.hacktivismo.com.  In an interview with Shift.com, he discusses software he has 
developed such as an anonymous tunneling protocol program and a program to embed 
messages inside of gif images to bypass censorship filters.    He reports that there has 
been considerable activity using these programs from Iran.  [Moyes 02]  This technology 
has been used by hackers and bloggers alike to subvert government filtering.  Although 
there was no evidence of this type of software being developed by Iranian programmers, 
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there have been other potential politically motivated hacks.  The weblog by the reformist 
Iranian former Vice President Abtahi’s weblog was hacked numerous times in response 
to his postings regarding the government torture of other webloggers.  Word of this cyber 
attack has spread throughout the Internet on other blogger’s sites.  One such post on the 
blog of “Persian Students in the UK” attributed the following quote to Abtahi in which he 
hints that there is a greater conspiracy of hacking against him: 
Again for a few days I was unable to publish anything. The reason is 
probably obvious, after writing the post about the arrested bloggers. If I 
get into trouble again, I will write about it comprehensively.” 
Persian Students in the UK theorize that these hackers are funded by conservative 
elements within the country.  (Parthisan 05)  Other political sites have also been hacked.  
A more recent example of possible hacktivism is the distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack of an ex-Presidential candidate Ali Larijani.  The campaign committee for Larijani 
claimed that the opposition had hacked his sight due to his political views.  News of this 
activity has also made itself into several Iranian blogs such as 
regimechangeiran.blogspot.com and nowrooz.blogspot.com.  Evidence that politically 
motivated hacking is occurring within Iran is fairly substantial.  The attacks on the 
websites of Larijani and Abtahi indicate that elements within the country are attempting 
to silence the opposition.  Many bloggers have theorized that the government has been 
conducting these attacks.  Bloggers such as Hoder have gone as far as to label the hard 
line governments as “IT-ollahs.”  [Derakhshan 05]  There was no evidence validating 
these claims, but this opinion is widespread throughout the blogging community. 
 
3. Religious Motivations 
As with the rest of the Islamic World, Islam has significant influence upon the 
lives of the Iranian people.  Fatwas issued by religious scholars have significant influence 
upon those who follow Islam  The World Wide Web is also used to disseminate 
information by scholars regarding Islamic law with some of them offering online fatwas 
for those with specific questions.  These fatwas can be found on websites such as 
www.islamtoday.com and www.islamonline.net, and www.ask-imam.com.  One 
particular fatwa issued by Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustapha, a Professor of Jurisprudence 
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and Its Principles at the International Islamic University of Malaysia, issued a fatwa 
giving permission to hack into computers.  The question posed to him was: 
Respected scholar, I’d like to know the Islamic ruling on hacking web 
sites that serve the American and Israeli interests on the Internet? 
Dr. Moustapha’s response gives permission to hack into sites as defined below: 
Your question seems to be too general. However, Islam does stand for 
better cooperation and communications with nations who are not 
destroying and fighting us.  This is clearly stated in Almighty Allah’s 
saying: “Allah forbiddeth you not those who warred not against you on 
account of religion and drove you not out from your homes, that ye should 
show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo ! Allah loveth the just 
dealers. Allah forbiddeth you only those who warred against you on 
account of religion and have driven you out from your homes and helped 
to drive you out, that ye make friends of them. Whosoever maketh friends 
of them (All) such are wrong doers.” (Al-Mumtahanah: 8-9).  This means 
that one should differentiate between those enemies who are killing our 
innocent and helpless Muslims around the world and those enemies who 
help or assist them in doing so. 
In addition to that, one has to do his best to tackle and hack those sites 
which are meant to murder and kill Muslims. Furthermore, Muslims 
should be able to discover the plans and strategies of our enemies in order 
for them to come up with strategies that will protect us against the attacks 
of the enemies. 
In this regard, I shall say there is no harm or prohibition to hack any site 
meant to destroy Muslims or occupy our lands. It is a legitimate right to 
defend ourselves by using all possible means and tools including hacking 
and destroying those evil sites.  [Moustapha 04] 
The fatwa above speaks with generalizations and does not say who the target of the attack 
should be.  Given the United States military operations ongoing throughout the world, it 
could be assumed that he was referring to the United States and its allies.  Although 
considered a powerful statement in Islamic law, a fatwa is only binding for the follower 
of the person who issues it.  Many people in the Islamic world believe that there is a lack 
of structured leadership in Islam and there are far too many people who can issue fatwas.  
Nonetheless, statements like the one from Dr. Moustapha indicate that traditional Islamic 
jihad motivations could be used as a justification for cyber attack.   
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4. Hacking as an Instrument of Foreign Policy 
There are several tools available to a nation state to execute its foreign policy, 
some examples of these include diplomacy, economic pressure, and military force.  
Given the overwhelming dominance of the United States and its allies in world affairs, 
Iran’s national military strategy to counter this perceived threat is to develop asymmetric 
warfare capabilities.  One such capability is cyber warfare.  No direct evidence of Iranian 
sponsorship of CNA was found, but it is possible that the capability is being considered 
or even currently being developed.   
 
E. IRANIAN HACKING GROUPS 
There is quite a substantial hacking community within Iran.  The skills of these 
hackers range from unskilled amateurs that can use software tools that are developed to 
exploit already known vulnerabilities to skilled hackers that find new vulnerabilities and 
exploitations.  Due to government filtering, all the sites found during the research were 
hosted in countries outside Iran.  A substantial number of websites posted vulnerabilities, 
exploits and downloadable software tools in Iran.  Several of them stood out due to 
increased level of sophistication and number of attacks credited to them.  These website 
were the Iran Hacking Sabotage Team, Aysahne Digital Security Team, and Iran Babol-
Hacking Team.     
 
1. Iran Hackers Sabotage Team 
The Iran Hackers Sabotage (IHS) Team is one of the most active hacking groups 
in Iran.  It is listed with Zone-H.org as one of the world’s top attackers.  According to 
Zone-H, IHS has conducted 3551 attacks of which 481 were single IP attacks and 3069 
were mass defacements.  The target of attacks that IHS have attacked include 
commercial, local and federal government, and academics domains within the United 
States.  IHS has also conducted attacks on foreign domains throughout the world.  [Zone 
05]  According to their website, they were established in early 2004 to put Iran on the 
map with regards to hacking ability.  After being able to successfully penetrate servers 
throughout the world, they decided to offer vulnerability assessment services and secure 
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web hosting.  The team consists of three hackers named NT, C0d3r, and LorD.  
According to the biographies on the website, NT and C0d3r are university students at an 
unnamed university.  LorD claims that he is a security researcher and a programmer.  All 
three express an interest in networking and exploitation coding.  Several original 
exploitation programs were available for download.  Each download was uncompiled 
code written for Visual C++ and contained comments providing the history of the 
bug/exploit.  All of the exploitations available on the IHS website were based on bugs 
found by other people or organizations.  Typically each exploitation code was generated 
by IHS within a few days of public release of the vulnerability on various security sites.  
Some examples of exploitations found include a local root exploit for IBM AIX, 3Com 
3cdameon BOF exploit, Internet Download Manager remote stack overflow exploit, and 
PMsoftware Web Server version 1.0 remote stack server overflow exploit.  The 
exploitation code also contained the name Kaveh Razavi as the name for C0d3r.  [IHS 
05]  A picture of the IHS website is shown below. 
 
Figure 5.   Iran Hacking Sabotage Team Website  [IHS 05] 
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According to Zone-H, IHS is responsible for the July 25th, 2005 attack on the 
U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo’s public website (http://nsgtmo.jax.spawar.navy.mil).  A 
saved copy of the attack is depicted below.  According to the text in the attack, the IHS 
expressed disagreement with US foreign policy.  As of August 10th, 2005, the Naval 
Station’s website was still not available.  Other attacks by IHS upon U.S. government 
sites include the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and various local county websites.   
 
 
Figure 6.   Naval Station Guantanamo’s Defaced Webpage [Zone 05] 
 
2. Ashiyane Digital Security Team 
Another of the more well known Iranian hacking teams is the Ashiyane Digital 
Security Team.  According to Zone-H, the Ashiyane DST is accredited with 3,007 attacks 
of which 396 were single IP attacks and 2611 were mass defacements.  [Zone 05]  Their 
website is included below.  A simple Google search of the team name yields numerous 
web sites that have been hacked by the Ashiyane DST.  Like the IHS, this team’s 
principle motivation is to sell its security consultation, web hosting, and network 
consulting services.  There was also some evidence of this team having using political 
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motivations to hack.  A defacement of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) website below also questioned the United States’ Middle East foreign policy.  
Other attacks by Ashiyane were simply used to put their name with links to their website 
on the world-wide web.  An example of one of Ashiyane DST’s advertising attacks is 
shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Ashiyane Digital Security Team Website  [Ashiyane 05] 
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Figure 8.   National Aeronautics and Space Administration Website Hack  
by Ashiyane DST [Zone 05] 
 
Figure 9.   An “advertising” attack upon www.svidal.com  
by Ashiyane DST  [Zone 05] 
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According to their website, the Ashiyane DST appears to be fairly well organized.  
They have several teams including management, training, defacement, and software 
programming teams.  There were biographies listed for 15 members of the team.  The 
team leader is Behrooz Kamalyan who goes by the nickname Behrooz_Ice.  The team 
member’s ages ranged from 16 to 28.  The member of this group had a wide variety of 
computer related skills.  Most of the team members boast experience in the major 
operating systems such as Windows, UNIX, Cisco IOS, and LINUX.  Many of them had 
programming experience in languages such as C, C++, VC++, Delphi, and Perl.  All of 
them claimed some sort of hacking capabilities to include firewall penetration, social 
engineering, php database hacking, operating system penetration, shareware cracking, 
and decoding program executables.  Several of these members conducted classroom 
training for a fee on topics such as basic, advanced, and professional levels of hacking, 
hacking tools, and a list of other programming languages, operating systems, and 
professional certifications.  These classes were taught in an audio/visual classroom at a 
vocational school in Tehran.  The cost of hacking training varied by the level of 
instruction; the basic course cost approximately $200.00 for 40 hours of instruction while 
the professional level course cost approximately $355.00 for the same amount of 
instruction time.  The Ashiyane DST appears to a very active and a well structured 
organization for hacking in Iran.  Its members have a vast amount of technical knowledge 
and experience that could be used to develop a government sponsored CNA/E capability. 
 
3. Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team 
Very little is known of the Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team (BHST).  Zone-H 
attributes 297 attacks with 278 as single IP attacks and 20 as mass defacements.  A 
Google search of Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team yields many websites that have been 
defaced by them.  Their website was very well designed but contained very little 
information about the team.  A picture of the site is included below.  While no 
biographies were posted, the team members appear to be Ezrael, The Undertaker, Black-
Ice, FaOp, and PoPo.  Most of the site was still under construction, but a statement on the 
site claims that it will post training videos and computer security related topics in the 
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future.  While very little information could be determined from their website, the BHST 
has shown that it has the necessary skills to conduct attacks on the internet.   
 
Figure 10.   Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team Website  [IBHST 05] 
 
Activity by hacking groups such as the Iran Hackers Security Team, Ashiyane 
Digital Security Team, and the Iran Babol-Hacker Security Team indicate a substantial 
hacking community within Iran.  There was evidence of many more hacking group’s 
webpages or web logs.  The groups listed above were the most active and well-known 
groups found.  This malicious hacking activity indicates that an organic CNA/E 
capability exists.  Although there was no evidence that the activity by these groups were 
supported by the Iranian government, a potential exists for Iran to hire the individuals 





F. DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFYING IRANIAN HACKERS 
It can be difficult to identify hackers and the origins of attacks on the Internet.  
There are several reasons why this is so, including:  
 
1. Internet Protocol (IP) Spoofing 
IP Spoofing is an attempt to gain access using a different IP address.  The hacker 
uses a variety of techniques to find an IP address from an external computer that is 
allowed access to the target network or computer, or to access an IP address from the 
addresses that the computers on a targeted network use. The illicitly obtained IP address 
is then used to modify the packet headers that the hacker sends, thereby tricking the target 
network or computer into allowing the hacker access to the target host.  Sophisticated 
hackers undoubtedly use this technique to gain access to a protected network.  Iranians 
could use this method to disguise their true address making it nearly impossible to trace 
the origin of the attack. 
 
2. Communication Bouncing 
Communication bouncing involves bouncing communications through a 
distributed network to disguise the true origin.  Hackers can do this in a couple of 
different ways.  The first method involves a hacker gaining access to a server or series of 
servers and then using them as the source of an attack.  A second and far easier method is 
to use an online service such as the Tor network (www.tor.eff.org).  It uses a set of relay 
servers to keep communications private and to prevent internet traffic from being 
analyzed.  A diagram is included below to illustrate how a message is sent over the Tor 
network.  The communications between the nodes can also be encrypted to prevent any 
packet sniffing.  Iranian hackers could use this technology to not only bypass government 
filters, but also hack into computer networks.   
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Figure 11.   Message being bounced through several nodes on the Tor  
network.  [Dingledine/Mathewson/Syverson 04] 
 
3. Manipulation of Event Logs 
Most systems utilize system logs that record notable system events.  While these 
logs are considered an essential security practice, hackers have found ways to bypass or 
change them to disguise their attacks.  Some of these techniques are well-known 
throughout the Internet.  It is likely that Iranian hackers use these techniques to avoid 
identification. 
 
4. Lack of Accurate Cyber Attack Reporting 
According to a speech by FBI Director Robert Mueller, most businesses do not 
report cyber attacks.  Reports of identity theft in the media have become quite common 
causing damage to a company’s public image.  This has caused a reluctance to report 
attacks to the authorities.  A survey by the Computer Security Institute revealed that 
fewer than 20% of companies have reported computer intrusions for 2004.  In his speech, 
Director Mueller stated that the FBI “cannot investigate if we are not aware of the 
problem.''  This is a substantial problem that affects the accurate diagnosis of hacking 




This chapter discussed the activities, motivations, and difficulties encountered 
through open source research of Iran’s CNA/E activities.  Iranian hackers have 
established a loosely formed virtual community of web logs and security websites 
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discussing network vulnerabilities and exploitations.  The task of identifying hackers, 
their motivations, and sponsorship however, can be difficult.  While Iran has a fairly 


























VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
1. Academic and Research Activity Shows an Extensive Interest in CNO 
Activity 
Iranian academic and research institutions are on par with comparable institutions 
throughout the world.  Many of the scientists and academic researchers that specialize in 
computer security have been educated in both Iranian and western academic institutions.  
Iranian academic and research institutions actively contribute by participating in 
international conferences and academic publications.  There is adequate access to 
information resources via the internet available to scientists.  The interaction with the 
international computer security community ensures adequate knowledge transfer.   
There is substantial government interest in embracing the study of information 
technology.  Several Iranian public academic institutions are pursuing research in 
computer security related topics.  Faculty members from many academic institutions have 
had experience in or are actively pursuing topics that are relevant to CNO.  Overall goals 
for information technology research have been promulgated by guidance in the evolving 
Five Year Plans.  The Iranian government has maintained oversight of research efforts 
through the Technology Cooperation Office and the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology.  The establishment of the Iranian Telecommunications 
Research Center, Guilan Science Technology Park, and the Paradis Technology Park are 
used to facilitate research.  A firm foundation has been established for Iran to become one 
of the most technologically advanced nations in the Middle East.   
 
2. Malicious Hacking is Widespread throughout Iran 
Malicious hacking within Iran is widespread.  There were dozens of websites, 
blogs, and discussion groups that promulgate information pertaining to vulnerabilities 
exploitations, and software tools.  There was substantial evidence of hacking techniques 
such as domain hijacking, web page defacements, and software vulnerability exploitation.  
The activity found appeared to be mostly juvenile hacking that was unstructured and 
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unorganized.  The motivations for this activity can be attributed to general hacking 
motives such as power, money, politics, recognition, etc.  There have been some claims 
that the government has used CNA to disrupt the efforts of political candidates and 
dissidents, but this study found no evidence found of government support or organization 
of this type of activity.   
 
3. Open Source Information Regarding Government-Sponsored CNO is 
Not Widely Available 
Throughout the research, there was an abundance of information regarding cyber 
attack activity originating from Iran.  Most of this information is based on generalizations 
and suppositions made from Iran’s potential capability to conduct cyber attacks.  
Difficulties arise when trying to establish a direct link between the government and 
malicious hacking.  Nation states typically try to keep their CNA/E capabilities from 
being released to the public as disclosure of this information would endanger the 
effectiveness of such operations.  Information regarding the United States’ CNO 
activities is kept at a classified level, and it is reasonable to assume that Iran’s CNO 
capabilities are treated similarly.  Open source information regarding the Iranian 
government’s CNO activity is merely speculative and based on its potential for attack.  
There was an abundance of evidence to indicate that this speculation is worthwhile in 
determining an adequate analysis for CND of critical infrastructures.  Although no direct 
evidence was found linking the Iranian government to a cyber attack capability, the 
information technology infrastructure, educational system, and government research 
activity indicates that such activity is possible if explored by the government.  Iran’s 
education and research system actively participates in the world-wide community with 
regards to computer security.  Computer security specialists within Iran would be able to 
support or conduct cyber attacks for the government.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. The Assessment of a CNA/E Capability by Terrorist Groups 
Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah use the internet as a tool for 
public relations and recruiting.  Messages from terrorist leaders are often published to the 
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web prior to the mainstream media receiving hardcopies.  Given a terrorist’s modus 
operandi of seeking out asymmetric capabilities against a more powerful enemy, these 
groups may be seeking to develop a CNA/E capability.  An analysis of selected terrorist 
groups’ CNA/E capabilities and limitations may provide insightful information to 
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